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We analyse a two-country model of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and R&D-
offshoring. In the basic model, two firms, each of which is originally situated in
only one of the two countries, first decide whether to build a plant abroad. Then,
they decide whether to relocate R&D activities offshore. Finally, they engage in
product-market competition. In this model, FDI liberalization causes a relocation of
R&D activities if intrafirm communication is sufficiently well developed, external spil-
lovers are substantial, competition is not too strong and foreign markets are not too
small. Surprisingly, such a relocation of R&D activities usually nevertheless increases
domestic welfare.
JEL classifications: F23, O30.
1. Introduction
This paper analyses the determinants of multinational firms’ choices of locations
for production and R&D. We start from a set of stylized facts:
Stylized Fact 1 Most of the private-sector R&D is done by multinational firms.
Global business R&D expenditure in 2002 amounts to $450 billion, of which at
least two thirds are carried out by multinationals (UNCTAD, 2005). Importantly,
R&D offshoring is gaining pace:
Stylized Fact 2 Multinationals increasingly move R&D offshore.
The global R&D expenditure of foreign affiliates amounted to $30 billion in 1993
and $67 billion in 2002 (UNCTAD, 2005). While the share of foreign affiliates in
total business R&D is still not very high, it is increasing rapidly.1 This mirrors
..........................................................................................................................................................................
1 For similar statements, see Caves (1996, ch.7), Florida (1997), Kuemmerle (1999), Belderbos (2001),
von Zedtwitz and Gassmann (2002), Belderbos (2003).
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a broader pattern concerning international service outsourcing. While the share of
business services produced abroad is still very low, it has grown substantially re-
cently (Amiti and Wei, 2004).
A large empirical literature investigates what kind of locations are likely to
be hosts of R&D offshoring. The findings are summarized as follows.2
Stylized Fact 3 R&D by foreign affiliates is attracted particularly to
(i) large markets and markets with high per capita income;
(ii) locations where the firms have manufacturing and sales activities;
(iii) countries with large technological know-how (technology sourcing).
Part (iii) reflects the fact that firms are increasingly using knowledge generated
in their international subsidiaries as an input to home-country production.
Thus, foreign R&D is often accompanied by technology sourcing. For instance,
this influenced the location decisions of Japanese firms in the US (Kogut and
Chang, 1991). More generally, the importance of technology sourcing has been
documented in many empirical papers.3
In spite of their growing importance, R&D offshoring and technology sourcing
have hardly been analysed theoretically. Important questions are:
(i) What circumstances favor offshoring and technology sourcing?
(ii) What are typical characteristics of R&D host countries?
(iii) How are multinational firms’ choices of production locations influenced
by considerations concerning R&D locations?
(iv) What are the welfare effects of R&D offshoring?
We analyse these issues in a simple model which is designed to capture the above
stylized facts, in particular, 2 and 3. There are two countries and two firms, each of
which is originally situated in only one of the two countries. In Stage 1, firms decide
whether to build one plant in the foreign country.4 In Stage 2, they decide whether
to relocate cost-reducing R&D activities offshore and, in stage 3, they engage in
product-market competition. Following Marshall (1920), there are external loca-
tional knowledge spillovers: if firms carry out R&D in the same location, knowledge
flows from one firm to the other, for instance, because employees change firms, or
because informal contacts are more likely. As a result, the cost reduction is greater
than if each firm innovates in an isolated location.5
..........................................................................................................................................................................
2 See, for example, Zejan (1990), Belderbos (2001, 2003).
3 Relevant studies include: Cantwell and Hodson (1991), Ha˚kanson and Nobel (1993), Neven and Siotis
(1993), OECD (1994), Baily and Gersbach (1995), Almeida (1996), Florida (1997), Kuemmerle (1997),
Branstetter (2006), Frost (2001), and Griffith et al. (2004).
4 We are abstracting from the possibility of multiple subsidiaries.
5 As usual in the literature, we model the extent of external spillovers as an exogenous parameter. In
Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003a,b), however, we show how spillovers can be endogenized in a wage-
bidding game.
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In principle, cost reductions generated in the parent firm also accrue to the
subsidiary, and vice versa. However, we assume that there are (usually small)
imperfections in the internal knowledge flows in both directions. Thus, a cost
reduction in the parent firm will possibly lead to a smaller cost reduction in the
subsidiary and vice versa.
Therefore, FDI has a dual role: apart from market access, it allows for technology
sourcing which requires that firms move to R&D centres where they have to build
up absorptive capacity of their own to benefit from spillovers. The knowledge
obtained in these R&D centres is transferred to the home countries, where it
reduces costs and thus increases profits. For instance, in the financial service in-
dustry, London has emerged as the dominant research centre in Europe. Similarly,
in the computer industry, many foreign firms moved parts of their R&D activities
to Silicon Valley to benefit from the presence of their North-American competitors.
We obtain the following answers to the four questions posed above: first,
FDI liberalization may induce R&D offshoring when intrafirm communication is
sufficiently strong, product-market competition is sufficiently weak, and external
spillovers are sufficiently strong. Surprisingly, however, there are potential non-
monotone effects of improving intrafirm communication and higher external spil-
lovers on the extent of FDI. Second, compared to a setting without the possibility of
R&D relocation, FDI becomes more attractive. Third, offshoring usually increases
domestic welfare since it only occurs if intrafirm communication is well developed
and therefore knowledge generated and obtained abroad flows back to the domestic
country. Fourth, though there are also conceivable countereffects, large markets are
particularly attractive as R&D hosts because the knowledge generated in the sub-
sidiaries can then also be used to improve competitiveness in those markets.
The R&D decisions of multinationals have been examined by other authors; to
our knowledge, however, none of them treats FDI and R&D locations as jointly
endogenous, except for our earlier paper (Gersbach and Schmutzler, 1999). The
spillover technology we use in the present paper, with both intrafirm and interfirm
spillovers, goes back to this earlier contribution. However, the original paper
addressed very different questions.6 Building from the model of spillovers intro-
duced in Gersbach and Schmutzler (1999), Belderbos et al. (2008) provide a theory
of R&D locations, but treat FDI as exogenous.7 Papers such as Lin and Saggi (1998),
Siotis (1999), Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000), Norba¨ck (2001), Glass and
Saggi (2002), Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006), Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers (2007),
and Dawid et al. (2008) discuss FDI decisions in their relation to innovation and
spillovers, without considering offshoring.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
6 In a setting with Bertrand competition, we asked under which circumstances multi-plant firms produce
in some joint location so as to benefit from technology sourcing.
7 These authors concentrate exclusively on choices of R&D locations, assuming that both firms operate
in both markets. Also, welfare issues are not treated. Whereas we take one polar case (namely that a
firm’s R&D can only occur in one location), Belderbos et al. (2008) emphasize the other polar case that
R&D is perfectly divisible across locations. Moreover, they allow for asymmetries between firms.
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Section 2 introduces the model. In Section 3, we analyse the equilibria of the
R&D location game. Section 4 calculates the subgame perfect (FDI) equilibria.
Section 5 provides more specific results for a Cournot example. Section 6 discusses
welfare effects. Section 7 extends the game to asymmetric countries. Section 8
contains a more general robustness discussion with various extensions of our
model. Section 9 concludes and sketches some generalizations of the model.
2. The model
2.1 Stages of the game
Consider the following three-stage game. There are two firms, k = 1,2, and two
countries, s = 1,2. Initially firm 1 has a plant in country 1, and firm 2 has a plant
in country 2. The firms’ actions can be summarized as follows:
Stage 1: firms decide whether to carry out FDI or not (FDI stage).
Stage 2: firms choose R&D locations (offshoring stage).
Stage 3: product-market competition takes place.
In Stage 1, each firm decides whether to become multinational, that is, whether
to build an additional plant in the country where it has no production facilities, at a
fixed cost of F> 0. In Stage 2, firms decide whether to continue to carry out their
R&D activities (or ‘innovate’) at home (H) or whether to relocate them abroad (A).
Relocation involves fixed costs R> 0. In the basic version of our model, we make
two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that relocation (or ‘offshoring’) is
only possible if the firm has carried out FDI.8 Second, in case of relocation, the
R&D location at home is closed.9 Each firm therefore has exactly one location
where it performs R&D, and relocation is treated as a zero-one decision. The
assumptions will be relaxed in Sections 8.1 and 8.4, respectively.10
2.2 Cost structure
Two important considerations are assumed to influence the cost structure:
(i) External spillovers: when both firms carry out R&D in the same country, they
benefit from external knowledge spillovers which allow them to produce at
lower marginal costs than if they carry out R&D alone.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
8 This is consistent with item (ii) in Stylized Fact 3 that firms tend to locate R&D near production.
9 Of course, this decision could be endogenized. Intuitively, firms will not have two R&D locations if
either the fixed costs of maintaining both locations are high or if intrafirm communication is sufficiently
well developed. We assume that duplication of R&D is not profitable, which puts a lower bound on the
cost of duplication of R&D and the strength of intrafirm knowledge transfer.
10 The first of these two items is consistent with item (ii) in Stylized Fact 3 that firms tend to locate R&D
near production. However, in principle, R&D without manufacturing is also conceivable.
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The assumption that external spillovers only arise in locations where both firms
have R&D activities is plausible if absorbing knowledge that is relevant for R&D
requires the local presence of qualified personnel.
(ii) Intrafirm knowledge transfer: knowledge generated in the parent firm is useful
in subsidiaries (and vice versa), but the resulting cost reduction from R&D
is usually not as large as in the location where the knowledge is generated.
As intrafirm knowledge transfer helps to avoid duplication in research efforts, it
has long been recognized as a reason for the emergence of multinational firms
(Dunning, 1981; Caves, 1996).11 There are many reasons why intrafirm commu-
nication might not be perfect, however. Obviously, there could be costs of commu-
nication between different plants and costs of intrafirm labour mobility. There
might also be incentive problems: if managers of different plants are rewarded
according to relative performance schemes, they may not be willing to release all
relevant information.
The existence of external spillovers and (imperfect) intrafirm knowledge transfer
translates naturally into the following assumptions about marginal costs, which are
assumed to be constant. As a reference cost level h, it is convenient to use produc-
tion costs in the absence of R&D. The maximal cost reduction D relative to h is
obtained in locations where both firms are present with their R&D activities, so that
(i) there are external spillovers and (ii) knowledge can be used locally, that is,
without transferring it between parents and subsidiary or vice versa. The cost
structures in all possible cases are thus given as follows:
(i) Suppose there is a location i where both firms are present with their R&D
activities (and with FDI as a precondition for R&D). Then
(a) marginal costs in i are h–D for both firms, because the firms both benefit
from knowledge spillovers and there are no losses from internal transfer
of knowledge.
(b) marginal costs in location j 6¼ i are h–gD for some g2(0,1): a fraction
(1–) of the cost reduction in location i is lost due to internal knowledge
transfer to j.
(ii) Suppose there is no location i where both firms are present with their R&D
activities, and thus no external spillovers occur. Then
(a) marginal costs in a firm’s R&D location are given as h–D for some
2(0,1). The firm does not benefit from external spillovers; it has to
rely exclusively on knowledge it has generated locally.
(b) marginal costs in a location without own R&D are h–gD> 0: the firm
does not benefit from external knowledge spillovers and has to rely on
knowledge it has generated elsewhere.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
11 See Baily and Gersbach (1995) for some evidence.
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Costs are thus lowest in case (i)(a) and highest in (ii)(b).12 The ranking between
the costs in cases (i)(b) and (ii)(a) (that is, the relative size of  and g) depends on
whether internal knowledge transfer is more effective than external spillovers. For
low values of , external spillovers are essential for cost reduction, because the
difference between costs without and with spillovers is h–D–(h–D) = (1–)D.
In Stage 3, both firms take production decisions, with marginal costs determined
as above. Markets are segregated, that is, we consider only non-tradeable goods or
services; but we will extend the discussion to tradeable goods in Section 8.2.13
Depending on the locations of production and R&D, possible product market
profits in one location are denoted by
PMðÞ,PMðÞ,PDð1, 1Þ,PDð, Þ,PDð,Þ,PDð,Þ,
using the following conventions: PM stands for a monopoly profit; PD for a duop-
oly profit. The entries in brackets stand for cost reductions relative to h:  corre-
sponds to h–D, g corresponds to h–gD, etc. When there are two entries, the first
one corresponds to the firm whose profits we are considering, the second one to the
competitor. For example, PD(1,1) corresponds to the profits of firms in a research
centre, PD(, g) to the duopoly profit of a firm in its home country when there is
no offshoring. Finally, we simplify PD(1,1)PD(1), PD(,) PD().
Assuming that the unique equilibrium is played in the product market stage, the
game can be reduced to the first two stages, that is, to the choice of production and
innovation locations. The following assumption gives very weak conditions on the
nature of oligopolistic interaction.
Assumption 1 (a) Duopoly profits are decreasing in own costs and increasing in
competitor costs, and (b) PD(g) is increasing in g, and PD(g)<PD(1).
Part (a) is satisfied in standard oligopoly models; part (b) is satisfied whenever
the positive effect of lower own costs on profits dominates over the negative effect
of lower competitor costs. This requires very reasonable assumptions on demand
elasticities (Shapiro, 1989).
3. The offshoring subgames
There are offshoring subgames with one and two direct investors.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
12 Nevertheless, in case (ii)(b) costs are still lower than in the hypothetical case without R&D.
13 The service sector and the non-tradeable manufacturing sector comprise about two thirds of the
economy in industrialized countries, and both FDI and R&D are becoming increasingly important in
these industries (Neven and Siotis, 1993; Hackmann, 1997). For example, for banking and finance,
business consulting, general merchandising and telecommunications, FDI is the main form of
globalization.
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3.1 Subgames with one investor (asymmetric FDI)
Only the direct investor takes an offshoring decision. With offshoring,
this firm obtains payoffs PM(g) +PD(1) – F –R; without, its payoffs are
PMðÞ þPDð,Þ  F: Therefore, we obtain:
Remark 1 Suppose there is only one direct investor. Then there is an equilibrium
where this firm chooses offshoring if and only if
PMðÞ þPDð1Þ  PM ðÞ þPDð,Þ þ R: ð1Þ
Clearly, low relocation costs (R) favor offshoring. Surprisingly, however, at this
level of generality, the effects of the remaining parameters are still ambiguous. For
instance, both sides of (1) are increasing in g, so that it is not obvious whether
improved communication leads to more offshoring. Intuitively, as communication
improves, knowledge generated offshore leads to high monopoly profits at home,
but also to high duopoly profits abroad. However, the first effect would appear to
dominate; at least the Cournot example in Section 5 confirms that offshoring
becomes more likely as communication improves. Similarly, with better external
spillovers (lower ), not engaging in offshoring means foregoing greater cost reduc-
tions, as PM() is increasing in  and PD(g,) in the first argument. However,
lower  also means that the competitor’s costs without offshoring are higher; so
that PD(g, ) is not necessary increasing in . Again, in our Cournot example,
the offshoring equilibrium is more likely for lower .
3.2 Subgames with two investors (symmetric FDI)
The payoffs for this subgame are given in Table 1. Clearly, there is a ‘chicken’
structure in the relocation game, with each firm preferring the other one to
move: While product market profits are the same for both firms, the firm that
carries out R&D offshore has to bear the relocation costs (see Table 1). The sub-
game equilibria can therefore be characterized as follows.
Remark 2 Suppose both firms have carried out FDI. If
PDðÞ þPDð1Þ  PDð,Þ þPDð,Þ þ R, ð2Þ
there are two pure-strategy equilibria, (A,H) and (H,A). Thus, the equilibria
involve offshoring. If the sign in (2) is reversed, then there is an offshoring equilib-
rium (H,H).
Several comments are in order. First, for low relocation costs, the equilibrium
(H,H) coexists with another, rather implausible, equilibrium where both firms
relocate abroad (A,A). Second, with symmetric FDI, offshoring equilibria require
that competition is not too intense; otherwise firms differentiate each other in
terms of R&D locations to soften competition.14 Third, by (2), offshoring requires
..........................................................................................................................................................................
14 As competition becomes very intense, the left-hand side of (2) approaches zero, so that the condition
cannot hold.
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external spillovers to be large relative to relocation costs, so that one firm is willing
to bear the cost of offshoring to benefit from spillovers.15 Fourth, the effects of
improving communication are again ambiguous: by Assumption 1, as g increases,
so does PD(g). Intuitively, improving communication increases home profits for
a firm that offshores. However, PD(g, ) +PD(,g), the total profits of a firm
that does not offshore, could increase too. Even though a firm that does not
offshore faces tougher competition at home from the competitor that uses know-
ledge generated abroad (PD(,g) decreases as g increases), it can also compete
more effectively abroad, using knowledge generated at home (PD(g,) increases).
Again, our numerical example will suggest that nevertheless improvements in
communication tend to induce offshoring.
4. Subgame-perfect equilibria
To understand under which conditions offshoring takes place along with FDI, we
now analyse the subgame-perfect equilibria. The preceding analysis suggests that
we should distinguish between different parameter regions, according to the out-
come of the R&D game.
(i) LRC (‘low relocation costs’): if (1) and (2) both hold, offshoring obtains no
matter whether one or two firms have carried out FDI.
(ii) HRC (‘high relocation costs’): if (1) and (2) are both violated, there is no
offshoring in either type of subgame.
(iii) MRC (‘medium relocation costs’): if (1) holds, but (2) does not, offshoring
only takes place if one firm has carried out FDI.16
In regime LRC, relocation costs are so low that there is offshoring in any sub-
game with FDI. This immediately rules out all equilibria except for the following
three.
Table 1 Subgame with symmetric FDI
H A
H PD ,ð Þ þPD ,ð Þ  F PD 1ð Þ þPD ð Þ  F
PD ,ð Þ þPD ,ð Þ  F PD 1ð Þ þPD ð Þ  F  R
A PD ð Þ þPD 1ð Þ  F  R PD , ð Þ þPD ,ð Þ  F  R
PD ð Þ þPD 1ð Þ  F PD , ð Þ þPD ,ð Þ  F  R
..........................................................................................................................................................................
15 Clearly, if = 0, that is, R&D complementarities are essential for cost reduction, (2) will always hold
for R= 0; for  6¼ 0, this is not true in general.
16 In the numerical example below, it will turn out that (1) typically holds whenever (2) does. We shall
thus refer to the case as MRC (‘medium relocation costs’) and ignore the case that (2) holds, but (1)
does not. This case is similar to analyse as the MRC case.
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Proposition 1 In regime LRC:
(i) The no-FDI equilibrium exists if and only if:
PMðÞ  PMðÞ þPDð1Þ  F  R: ð3Þ
(ii) The symmetric FDI equilibrium (with offshoring) exists if and only if:
PDðÞ  F  R  0: ð4Þ
(iii) The asymmetric FDI equilibrium (with offshoring) exists if and only if
conditions (3) and (4) hold with  replaced with .
Condition (3) guarantees that the no-FDI equilibrium profit is higher than the
profit in the deviation subgame, which involves offshoring in LRC. For the sym-
metric FDI equilibrium, (4) makes sure both firms want to invest, bearing in mind
that, in LRC, the competitor would relocate in the equilibrium of the deviation
game.
In the MRC regime with intermediate relocation costs, the equilibria are differ-
ent, as a symmetric equilibrium with both firms investing cannot involve offshor-
ing. As in LRC, however, equilibria with symmetric FDI, with asymmetric FDI and
without FDI all arise. The Appendix gives the conditions under which each equilib-
rium arises.
In the HRC regime, R&D offshoring does not take place in any subgame.
Thus, the only issue for firms is whether FDI is worthwhile, that is, whether
PDð,Þ  F. If so, the equilibrium involves symmetric FDI; if not, there is no
FDI.17 In the Appendix, the result is stated more carefully.
5. The Cournot example
We consider a Cournot example, with linear demand function D(p) = a–p. We can
use standard formulas to calculate equilibrium profits. Throughout this section,
we choose  a–h= 1, D= 1.
5.1 The offshoring game
For these choices of  and D, the regime in the offshoring game depends on the
parameters , g and R. For sufficiently high relocation costs, there is no offshoring
in equilibrium for arbitrary choices of  and g, so that regime HRC arises.18 This
can be regarded as the benchmark case without the possibility of R&D relocation.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
17 In the degenerate case where the equilibrium condition holds with equality there is also an asymmetric
equilibrium where only one firm carries out FDI.
18 For our parameterization, R= 2 is sufficiently high for this to happen.
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To allow for relocation, we consider R= 0.5. Figure 1 gives the values of  and g for
which each regime arises.19
5.2 FDI equilibria
We now describe the subgame-perfect equilibria. We shall compare the benchmark
case without relocation (R very large) with the case that R= 0.5. In both cases,
we shall consider F= 1, F= 0.5, F= 0.2, and F= 0.1.
5.2.1 No offshoring Suppose relocation is too costly for arbitrary values of  and
g. For F= 1 and F= 0.5, no-FDI is the only equilibrium, independent of  and g.
For F= 0.1, symmetric FDI is the only equilibrium. In the intermediate case F= 0.2,
the equilibrium depends on parameters (see Fig. 2), with (symmetric) FDI arising
only for good intrafirm communication (g high) and effective home R&D
( high). Intuitively, when there is no offshoring, a firm carries out FDI only to
gain market access, resulting in profits PD(g,). It relies exclusively on its own
R&D, and it must transfer its knowledge abroad to benefit from FDI. When exter-
nal spillovers are essential and/or intrafirm communication is bad, FDI is not
worthwhile.
5.2.2 Offshoring Suppose relocation is possible (R= 0.5). As before, for F= 1,
no-FDI is the only equilibrium. For F= 0.5, however, Fig. 3 shows that there is
asymmetric FDI when intrafirm communication is very good and external spil-
lovers are essential.20 One firm engages in FDI and offshoring, so as to benefit from
external spillovers. It uses the knowledge obtained to increase its monopoly profit
0.0
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LRC
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g
Fig. 1 The offshoring game.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
19 For lower relocation costs, both regime boundaries would shift further to the right. However, even as
relocation costs approach zero, relocation does not necessarily arise for all parameters.
20 Here and in the following figures, dashed lines describe regime boundaries in the offshoring game.
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Fig. 2 FDI without offshoring possibilities (F=0.2).
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Fig. 3 The FDI game with low relocation costs (F=0.5).
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Fig. 4 The FDI game with low relocation costs (F=0.2).
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abroad. FDI thus requires the offshoring possibility: as we saw above, without
offshoring possibilities, no-FDI is the only equilibrium for F= 0.5.
For F= 0.2, Fig. 4 shows that, in the HRC region, for sufficiently good intrafirm
communication and internal R&D, there is symmetric FDI, as in the case without
offshoring option. Firms do not gain from offshoring, but they can earn sufficient
profits in the foreign location even so. In the LRC region and in the MRC region for
sufficiently good intrafirm communication and spillovers, there is asymmetric FDI
with offshoring in a large region where there was no-FDI without the offshoring
option.
For F= 0.1, Fig. 5 shows that, in regime HRC, for sufficiently good internal R&D
( high) and bad intrafirm communication (g low), there is no FDI. When internal
R&D (without spillovers) is already very effective, there is not enough to be gained
from FDI, because internal technology transfer is not very good. In intermediate
ranges, there is symmetric FDI. In most of this region, this is true even though there
is no offshoring and thus no benefit from external spillovers. Internal communica-
tion is sufficiently well developed that the foreign location can benefit from cost
reductions at home. Finally in most of the LRC and MRC regime, there is an
asymmetric FDI equilibrium. The prospects of external spillovers lure one firm
into the other country.
5.3 Summary
The analysis reveals that the offshoring option makes FDI more likely: for F= 0.5,
FDI does not arise without the offshoring possibility, whereas it does for sufficiently
low relocation costs.21 For F= 0.2 or F= 0.1, the parameter regions with FDI
become larger when offshoring is possible, as a comparison of Fig. 2 with Fig. 4
0.0
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0.6
1.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
symmetric FDI
No FDI
0.8
b
g
asymmetric FDI
Fig. 5 The FDI game with low relocation costs (F= 0.1).
..........................................................................................................................................................................
21 We have shown that relocation arises when there are no relocation costs, but by continuity, it also
arises for small positive values of R.
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shows. Moreover, asymmetric FDI, with only one firm carrying out FDI and off-
shoring R&D can arise in a symmetric setting. Moreover, both internal and external
spillovers can have non-monotone effects on FDI: for instance, for suitable param-
eter values higher external spillovers (decreases in ) lead from symmetric FDI to
no-FDI and then to asymmetric FDI (Fig. 4).
6. The welfare effects of FDI
The welfare effects of FDI on source countries and recipients have been the subject
of considerable debate, and they are often regarded as ambiguous.22 Based on our
analysis, we can obviously not give a complete discussion of this point. Most im-
portantly, welfare discussions of offshoring typically put particular emphasis on the
displacement of skilled labour (e.g., job losses of computer programmers in the US
as a consequence of software development to India). Our model does not address
this topic directly, because labour is only treated implicitly as a cost factor. Several
issues could be considered if a broader perspective is adapted. First, when labour
markets are flexible, general equilibrium considerations suggest that reducing home
country demand by offshoring will reduce wages and thus R&D employees will be
reemployed in other sectors. The extent of wage cuts and reemployability depends
on how general the skills of displaced R&D workers are. Second, deterioration of
home country employment is likely to reduce the willingness to acquire the ne-
cessary skills. This could happen if offshoring waves are expected and general
equilibrium effects are slow to generate new employment opportunities. In such
cases R&D offshoring might even generate outward migration.
In the following, we show that, even ignoring these employment effects, there is
an interesting channel by which offshoring affects welfare which is based on know-
ledge transfer and spillovers.
Proposition 2 Suppose g>. Further, suppose the equilibrium involves asymmet-
ric FDI and offshoring by firm 2. Then, welfare in country 2, defined as the sum of
consumer surplus and producer surplus, net of fixed costs and relocation costs, is
higher than it would be if no firm had invested in FDI. In country 1 the consumer
surplus is higher than without FDI, whereas the effect on producer surplus is
ambiguous.
Proof For an offshoring equilibrium, profits for firm 2 must be higher than in the
case without FDI. Thus, a sufficient condition for welfare to increase is that con-
sumer surplus does. As country 2 is served by a monopoly no matter whether
offshoring takes place or not, the consumer surplus increases if and only if the
costs are lower with offshoring than without. This is true if the cost reduction from
..........................................................................................................................................................................
22 See Graham and Krugman (1989), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Neven and Siotis (1993), Caves
(1996), Sanna-Randaccio (1996), and Markusen and Venables (1997) for an assessment of the
arguments.
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external spillovers dominates over the cost increase from having to rely on internal
communication, that is, if g>. œ
The assumption g> makes sure that the home-country cost reduction from
technology sourcing outweighs the losses from intrafirm communication. This
guarantees that home-country consumers benefit from lower prices. Of course,
even if   , welfare may be higher in an asymmetric offshoring equilibrium
than in an equilibrium without FDI, provided the producer surplus is much
higher in the former case.
7. The impact of market size
The empirical literature suggests that offshoring locations are more likely to emerge
in larger markets. We now give theoretical support for this statement, albeit with a
qualification. We show that, for certain parameter constellations, the larger country
is more likely to emerge as the offshoring location, but there are also conceivable
situations where the smaller market is the offshoring host. To understand this, we
introduce subscripts S and L for profits in the small and large country, respectively.
The following assumption captures the essence of market size:
Assumption 2 (i) For arbitrary cost constellations, profits are larger in the large
country, that is PML ð:Þ  PMS ð:Þ, PDL ð:Þ  PDS ð:Þ.
(ii) For arbitrary cost constellations, profit increases resulting from lower costs are
larger in the large country.
We now ask whether an asymmetric FDI equilibrium is more likely to occur in
the large country than in the small country. We confine ourselves to the LRC-
regime; with R= 0. Arguing as in Proposition 1, an asymmetric FDI equilibrium in
the large country requires
PDS ðÞ  F, ð5Þ
F  PDL ð1Þ þPMS ðÞ PMS ðÞ: ð6Þ
Condition (5) makes sure that the firm that is located only in the large country does
not deviate by adding a plant abroad; inequality (6) guarantees that the firm that
carries out FDI and practices R&D-offshoring gains from doing so rather than
refraining from FDI. An asymmetric FDI equilibrium in the small country requires
PDL ðÞ  F, ð7Þ
F  PDS ð1Þ þPML ðÞ PML ðÞ: ð8Þ
Clearly, condition (5) for an equilibrium in the large country is easier to satisfy than
the corresponding condition (7) for the small country: for the non-investor, de-
viating from an asymmetric FDI equilibrium in a large country by investing in the
small country is less attractive than deviating from an asymmetric FDI equilibrium
in a small country by investing in the large country. Hence, the conditions for the
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asymmetric equilibrium are easier to satisfy when the large country is the research
location provided (8) implies (6), that is,
PDL ð1Þ PDS ð1Þ  PML ðÞ PML ðÞ  ðPMS ðÞ PMS ðÞÞ: ð9Þ
The left-hand side is always positive, as the firm that carries out FDI and offshores
R&D has higher duopoly profits in a large location. If > g, the right-hand side is
negative. Since it is cheaper to serve the monopoly location with own home country
R&D than by sourcing from abroad, there is a second reason why an R&D location
in a large country is more robust than in a small country: the losses from not
serving the monopoly with local R&D are smaller when the monopoly location is
small. Thus (9) holds and offshoring into the large country is more likely.
If g>, however, the right-hand side of (9) is also positive by part (ii) of
Assumption 2: when the R&D location is large, the offshoring firm benefits less
from the positive R&D effects in its (small) home country monopoly. Therefore,
the equilibrium conditions are not necessarily easier to satisfy in the large country.
Indeed, consider a scenario where product-market competition in each market is
very strong (e.g., close to homogeneous Bertrand competition) and thus (9) is
violated.23 Then, product-market profits in both countries are essentially zero,
and thus so is the left-hand side of (9). The right-hand side, however, can
be very large in absolute value. Intuitively, in this setting, market access is no
reason for FDI and offshoring, whereas technology sourcing is. Therefore, com-
pared to an R&D centre in a large country, a centre in the small country has the
advantage that the gains in the monopoly location are larger, and essentially no
disadvantage.
8. Extensions
We now extend the basic model in several directions. First, we allow for offshoring
in locations where the firm is not present with production. Second, we consider
finite transportation costs. Third, we shall vary the timing of the game. Finally, we
allow for partial rather than complete R&D offshoring.
8.1 Offshoring without FDI
If we modify the basic model by assuming that offshoring is possible for both firms
at cost R> 0 for arbitrary investment decisions, the offshoring and the FDI decision
are decoupled: because access to knowledge does not require the presence of a
production location, firms carry out FDI if and only if the resulting duopoly profits
in the foreign country justify the fixed costs.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
23 By ‘strong competition’, we mean any type of product competition such that PDL 1ð Þ is sufficiently low.
For instance, think of price competition with goods that are not strongly differentiated.
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In Appendix 2, we show in more detail how the analysis has to be modified. For
every combination of FDI decisions both players have to decide whether or not to
offshore. We show that essentially as before, offshoring takes place in all relevant
subgames when intrafirm knowledge flows are good, relocation costs are low and
external spillovers are high.
Assuming that these conditions for offshoring are met, we then provide condi-
tions for an equilibrium without FDI, but with offshoring. Consistent with the
intuition given above, such an equilibrium exists if and only if PDð1Þ  F .
When offshoring without FDI is possible, the only motive for FDI is market
access to the foreign country. In the basic model, there was an additional incentive
for FDI, namely to obtain the option of offshoring and thereby gain access to
external spillovers which increase home country profits. Net of relocation costs,
this option is worth PM(g)–PM()–R.24 Whenever this expression is positive, the
no-FDI equilibrium arises for a larger parameter region than in the basic model.
While FDI typically becomes less attractive for firms than in the basic model, the
welfare effects for the home country are still positive whenever offshoring arises:
firms only move R&D offshore when it is profitable for them, and consumers
benefit from the cost reduction.
Decoupling of offshoring and FDI decisions allows us to consider another variant
of our model, namely that R&D offshoring precedes FDI. This analysis is very
similar to the analysis in this section, as the only motive for FDI is market access
to the foreign country while R&D offshoring enables access to external spillovers.
All qualitative conclusions regarding the emergence of offshoring and FDI remain
as before.
8.2 Tradable goods
For convenience, we ignored the possibility of finite transportation costs so far,
thus focussing on the case that exports are never an alternative. In the following, we
modify the basic model (where offshoring requires foreign production) by con-
sidering low transportation costs such that firms have no reason to carry out FDI
unless they benefit from spillovers. We denote the transportation costs per unit of
the commodity by t and for definiteness, we set t= 0.25 Thus, the quality of intra-
firm communication is irrelevant for FDI and offshoring decisions, as goods can be
exported from wherever they are produced most cheaply to the other country
at zero cost.
When only one firm has chosen FDI, it will relocate R&D offshore if and only if
2PDð1Þ  2PDðÞ  R  0: ð10Þ
..........................................................................................................................................................................
24 See Condition (3) in Proposition 1 of the paper.
25 In Appendix 3, we shall show that similar results hold for intermediate transportation costs such that
exports will always take place in the absence of FDI, that is, when the market cannot be served locally,
but not when the firm is present locally.
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Both firms obtain identical profits PD(1) in both locations. After deviation
to no-FDI, both firms will produce in their home location, resulting in profits
PD() for each firm in each location.
We now assume that (10) holds, so that relocation will take place in the offshor-
ing game. The condition for an equilibrium without FDI then becomes
F  2PDð1Þ  2PDðÞ  R: ð11Þ
There is no FDI if the net gains from offshoring are dominated by the fixed costs.
One might think that, with finite transportation costs, FDI is less attractive than
with infinite transportation costs, because exports are always an option which
would yield foreign profits of PDðÞ  0. However, the condition under which
(11) is more easily fulfilled than (3) is
PDðÞ  PM ðÞ PM ðÞ þPDð1Þ PDðÞ:
The FDI incentives in the case of infinite transportation costs differ from those
with zero transportation costs not only because they include the foreign country
profits PD(). In addition, for infinite transportation costs, FDI changes home
country profits by PM(g)–PM(), for zero transportation costs the effect is
PD(1)–PD(). However, at least when internal knowledge flows are sufficiently
good (so that g is close to 1), the effects should typically be mutually reinforcing.
A cost reduction by a certain amount for a monopolist is worth more than a
simultaneous cost reduction of both firms in an oligopoly. Hence, with well-devel-
oped internal communication, the intuition that FDI is less attractive with low
transportation costs than with infinite transportation costs holds in our model.
Finally, we note that the home country welfare effects of offshoring remain
positive whenever it takes place, because offshoring will only happen when the
firms benefit, and consumers also benefit from the cost reduction.
8.3 Simultaneous decisions
The main insights still hold if the decisions concerning FDI and R&D are carried
out simultaneously. Then, each firm has three possible strategies: no-FDI, FDI
without offshoring, and FDI with offshoring. The payoffs for each of the nine
resulting strategy profiles can be derived as before. An equilibrium without FDI
requires that firms neither deviate to FDI with or without offshoring; hence, con-
ditions (3) and (14) in the Appendix have to hold simultaneously. As before, the
equilibrium is likely to arise with high fixed costs and relocation costs and with
intense product-market competition, whereas, with bad intrafirm communication
and low R&D-spillovers, similar qualifications arise as in the sequential case.
Contrary to the sequential case, however, an asymmetric equilibrium with only
one firm carrying out FDI and offshoring cannot exist, except for degenerate cases.
An equilibrium with both firms carrying out FDI and one firm offshoring exists,
provided condition (2) holds and, in addition,
PDðÞ þPDð1Þ  PDð,Þ þ F þ R
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and
PDðÞ  F:
As in the sequential model, the offshoring equilibrium essentially requires para-
meters to be opposite than for the no-FDI equilibrium.26
8.4 Partial offshoring decisions
So far, offshoring was a zero-one decision: a firm can either move its R&D
abroad, or leave everything at home. This is obviously a polar case. We now
move to the other polar case that a firm can choose how to allocate its fixed budgets
between the two locations in an arbitrary way.
Thus we allow firms to move some arbitrary fraction i offshore at a cost K(i).
For instance, extending our assumptions on cost reductions for i 2 0, 1f g linearly
to the entire interval 0, 1½ , firm i obtains a cost reduction
ð1 iÞðj þ ð1 jÞÞ þ ðið1 jÞ þ jÞ
at home and
ð1 iÞðj þ ð1 jÞÞ þ ðið1 jÞ þ jÞ
abroad. As an example for how offshoring decisions are made in the continuous
setting, consider the subgame where only firm 1 has carried out FDI. Thus, it has a
monopoly at home and faces a competitor abroad that must have 2 = 0, because
it cannot offshore its R&D to foreign locations. Ignoring fixed costs of FDI
and relocation, payoffs of firm 1 are
PM ðð1 1Þþ 1Þ þPDðð1 1Þþ 1, ð1 1Þþ 1Þ K ðiÞ:
Denote the arguments of PM as x and of PD as x1 and x2. Then, the net marginal
benefits of offshoring (increasing 1) are
ð  Þ dP
M
dx
þ ð1 Þ @P
D
@x1
þ ð1 Þ @P
D
@x2
K 0 ð1Þ:
This term consists of (i) a cost-effect on the monopoly profit (which is positive if
external spillovers are strong and intrafirm communication is good); (ii) a positive
effect on own duopoly profits resulting from the fact that own costs in the foreign
location are lower with more offshoring; (iii) a negative effect on duopoly profits
resulting from the fact that the competitor also benefits from external spillovers; and
(iv) marginal relocation costs. The optimal level of relocation is obtained by setting
the net marginal benefit of relocation equal to zero. The analysis for the case where
both firms carry out FDI is similar. In this fashion, one can obtain general
..........................................................................................................................................................................
26 The only qualification concerns intrafirm spillovers which again have ambiguous effects on the off-
shoring equilibrium.
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comparative-statics condition for R&D. For the Cournot model and particular spe-
cifications of the relocation costs, different FDI/RDI constellations can be obtained.
9. Conclusions
We presented a model of multinational activity that differs from existing work
in several respects. Most importantly, we provide the only contribution where
FDI and R&D offshoring are both endogenous. The model is set up so that there
are potentially two motives for FDI, namely access to markets and to knowledge
generated locally.
Our first set of conclusions was derived for the case where (i) transportation
costs are infinite and (ii) R&D offshoring can only arise in locations where firms are
present with production. We obtained the following results. First, FDI liberalization
may lead to R&D offshoring. This requires sufficiently strong intrafirm commu-
nication, sufficiently weak product-market competition and sufficiently strong ex-
ternal spillovers. Surprisingly, however, once one moves beyond a simple linear
Cournot model, there are potential non-monotone effects of intrafirm communi-
cation and external spillovers on the extent of FDI. Second, the possibility of R&D
relocation makes FDI more attractive. Third, in our simple short-term partial
equilibrium model offshoring usually increases domestic welfare since it only
occurs if intrafirm communication is well developed and therefore knowledge
generated and obtained abroad flows back to the domestic country.27 Fourth,
though there are also conceivable countereffects, large markets are particularly
attractive as R&D hosts because the knowledge generated in the subsidiaries can
then also be used to improve competitiveness in those markets.
These conclusions have to be modified when R&D offshoring does not presup-
pose the existence of production facilities. In this case, there is a decoupling of FDI
and offshoring decisions: FDI takes place if and only if the market access motive
suffices to justify the fixed costs. When we change the basic model by allowing for
the possibility of exports, market access is no longer a strong motive for FDI
(at least when transportation costs are very low). Instead, the access to knowledge
becomes the dominant motive for FDI. Importantly, however, the welfare-enhan-
cing aspect of offshoring survives both modifications.
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Appendix 1: Equilibria for MRC and HRC
We now summarize the equilibrium structure in regime MRC.
Remark 3 In regime MRC:
(i) A no-FDI equilibrium exists if and only if
M ðÞ  M ð Þ þD 1ð Þ  F  R: ð12Þ
(ii) A symmetric FDI equilibrium exists if and only if
Dð,Þ þ D ,ð Þ  F  Dð1Þ: ð13Þ
(iii) An asymmetric FDI equilibrium exists if and only if (12) and (13) hold
with signs reversed.
Intuitively, condition (12) makes sure that the profits in the no-FDI case are higher
than under deviation to FDI, bearing in mind that the firm would relocate follow-
ing such a deviation in MRC. (13) guarantees that the investing firm does not want
to deviate by not investing.
The equilibrium structure in regime HRC is summarized as follows.
Remark 4 In regime HRC:
(i) A no-FDI equilibrium exists if and only if
0  PD ,ð Þ  F : ð14Þ
(ii) A symmetric FDI equilibrium exists if and only if
PDð,Þ  F  0: ð15Þ
Intuitively, as there can be no R&D offshoring on the equilibrium path or in
any deviation subgame, firms earn PD ,ð Þ  F in an FDI location. Thus, carry-
ing out FDI is worthwhile if and only if PD(g, )> F.28
Appendix 2: Offshoring without local production
We first derive conditions for equilibria with offshoring.29
Proposition 3 When both firms can choose offshoring independent of the pro-
duction location decisions, the equilibria of the relocation subgames are as follows:
(i) In the subgame without FDI, there are equilibria with R&D offshoring of one
of the firms if and only if
PMðÞ  R  PMðÞ: ð16Þ
..........................................................................................................................................................................
28 In the degenerate case that PD , ð Þ ¼ F, there is an asymmetric FDI equilibrium that is not strict.
29 Also, we ignore the implausible equilibrium where the non-investor relocates R&D offshore.
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(ii) In subgames with asymmetric FDI, there is R&D offshoring of the investor
if and only if
PM ðÞ þPD 1ð Þ  R  PM ð Þ þPDð,Þ: ð17Þ
Proof (i) In the subgame without FDI, payoffs in the proposed equilibrium are
given as PM ð Þ  R for the offshoring firm and PM 1ð Þ for the competitor. If
the offshoring firm deviates, its profits are PM ð Þ. The condition in (i) guarantees
that this deviation is not profitable. For the other firm, deviation to offshoring
would lower its payoffs as PM ð Þ  R < PM 1ð Þ.
(ii) In the subgame with asymmetric FDI, payoffs in the proposed equilibrium
are given as PM ð Þ þPD 1ð Þ  F  R for the offshoring investor. Deviating to no
offshoring would yield profits of PM ð Þ þPD ,ð Þ  F. Condition (17) guar-
antees that this is not profitable. Equilibrium payoffs for the competitor are PD 1ð Þ;
deviating to offshoring would yield profits of PD ,ð Þ  R. Because
PD ,ð Þ  PD ð Þ  PD 1ð Þ, this is never profitable. œ
The following implication is immediate:
Corollary 1 Offshoring equilibria exist in the no-FDI and asymmetric FDI
subgames if  = 1, R= 0 and  is strictly below 1.
We now investigate the implications for the FDI game. We ask under which
circumstances FDI arises, focusing on the case where offshoring takes place in the
second stage, which is the natural analogue of the case of low relocation costs
(LRC) in the basic model.
Proposition 4 Suppose (16)-(17) hold. An equilibrium without FDI, but with
offshoring exists if and only if
PDð1Þ  F:
Proof Conditions (16)–(17) guarantee that offshoring takes place in the equilibrium
subgame and in the subgames where one firm deviates in period 1. In the no-FDI
equilibrium, the offshoring firm obtains equilibrium payoffsPM ð Þ  R. Deviation
to FDI would yield PM ð Þ þPD 1ð Þ  F  R, anticipating that the deviating firm
would still carry out offshoring after the deviation. œ
Appendix 3: Offshoring with intermediate
transportation costs
We now show that the results for the case of zero transportation costs essentially
generalize to the case of intermediate transportation costs: more precisely, we make
the following assumptions:
Assumption 3 On the one hand, transportation costs are high enough that
locations are served locally whenever possible.
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Thus, marginal costs are never lower for a firm if it serves a location from abroad
than when it produces locally. This is automatically true in R&D locations of
the firm, whether it produces alone there or not. To make sure it is also true
in locations where the firm has no R&D, we require h  < hþ t and
h  < h þ t. It is simple to see that the former condition is harder to
fulfill, so that all we require is t>D(1–g), i.e., transportation costs are higher than
the losses from internal communication.
Assumption 4 On the other hand, transportation costs are low enough that, even
if an exporting firm faces a local competitor, it obtains positive profits in spite of
the higher marginal costs.
Thus, even in locations where only one firm is present, there is (asymmetric)
duopoly competition resulting in positive profits for both firms. It is simple to
show that both conditions can be fulfilled simultaneously in principle, a necessary
condition being that competition is not too intense.
In the profit formulas, we write T for a firm in a country to which it exports
from the home location when it is not an R&D centre. Hence, when there is no
research centre, the firms earn profits PD(, T) in their home location and
PD(T, ) in the foreign country. Similarly, for a firm that exports from a research
centre, we write 1T for its marginal cost h–D + t. Thus, if there is such a research
centre, then profits in the other country are PD(g,1T) for the firm that produces
there and PD(1T,g) for the exporter.
Consider the offshoring game when only one firm has chosen FDI. Then this
firm will choose offshoring if and only if
PDð1Þ þPDð, 1T Þ PDð,T Þ PD ,ð Þ  R  0:
In the research centre, both firms obtain identical profits PD(1); in the investor’s
home location, its profits are PD(g,1T), because it serves the location locally with
knowledge generated abroad in the research centre, whereas the competitor exports
to the location from the research centre. After deviation to No Offshoring, the firm
will face a competitor at home that serves the location from abroad, resulting in
profits of PD(, T). Abroad it will obtain PD(g, ) as it serves the foreign coun-
try with knowledge generated at home, facing a competitor who produces know-
ledge locally. Thus, the left-hand side gives the net advantage from offshoring.
We now assume that relocation will take place in the offshoring game, i.e., the
preceding condition holds. The condition for an equilibrium without FDI then
becomes
F  PDð, 1T Þ þPD 1ð Þ PDð,T Þ PDð,Þ  R: ð18Þ
The fixed costs must outweigh the net advantage from FDI and offshoring.
It is straightforward to compare (18) to (3). The arguments are similar as for no
transportation costs.
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